Abstract -The paper presents a version of the EMAIL Game, originally proposed by Rubinstein (AER,1989), in which efficient coordination is shown to obtain even when the relevant coordination game is not mutual knowledge. In the model investigated a mediator is introduced in such a way that the two individuals are symmetrically informed on the game chosen by nature, rather than asymmetrically as in Rubinstein. As long as the message failure probability is sufficiently low, with the upper bound being a function of the game payoffs, conditional beliefs on the opponent's actions can allow players to coordinate on the more rewarding-risky choice.
Introduction
In a remarkable paper Rubinstein (1989) proposed a game theoretic version of a coordination problem, posed also in the Artificial Intelligence literature (Gray,1978) where was made known as the "Coordinated Attack" (Halpern and Moses,1990) . Besides the interest in the matter per se, the problem attracted much attention because of its puzzling result (Nash Equilibrium (NE) in the game theoretic version). More specifically, in the Osborne and Rubinstein (1994) version of the model there is a unique and (ex-post) possibly inefficient outcome independently of the amount of information on the game that the two individuals might have. Alternatively, coordination may fail even when the game to be played is almost common knowledge, which in Rubinstein corresponds to a sufficiently high number of informative messages exchanged between the two individuals.
A distinguishing feature of the model is the initial informational asymmetry, existing between the two parties, on the action that they should coordinate upon. More specifically, in Rubinstein's framework only one individual is initially informed by nature on the game to be played; she, in turn, informs the opponent via electronic mail. In the "Coordinated Attack" problem this corresponds to the general, deciding the time of attack, being in perfect communication with one half of the army; indeed, typically he is viewed as being part of one of the two halves.
Since the communication protocol may not entail efficient use of the available information, namely players at the unique NE would choose actions as if no information on the game was exchanged, the possibility of alternative arrangements leading to more appropriate use of such information might, and should, be considered by the individuals involved. In the paper we discuss a simple variation of the original model, where a mediating figure (between nature and players) is introduced in such a way that the game to be played could still be individually, but never mutually, known. The motivation behind it is the following. If in Rubinstein almost common knowledge of the game is not enough for efficient coordination to obtain, then the explanation for such failure should not plausibly be looked for in this degree (depth) of interactive knowledge but rather elsewhere. In particular, our general intuition was that a main role must be played by the reliability of communication channels, since that is what supports the formation of individuals' beliefs concerning the opponent's possible actions. As is widely known, in a game with multiple equilibria beliefs on the opponent's actions play a fundamental role in selecting among them, even when the game is common knowledge. A fortiori, their importance is reinforced in absence of common knowledge. The model studied in the paper permits us a systematic investigation on the role of beliefs concerning actions (and the technology supporting them), since beliefs on the game to be played do not even allow it to be mutual knowledge. The main result of the work confirms our conjecture: if the reliability (message success probability) of communication channels is sufficiently high, with the critical threshold value being determined as a function of the game payoffs, then efficient coordination may obtain 1 .
Among the schemes one could have thought of, in the paper we concentrate on the following simple example. The two players in the game will delegate a third (party) computer the task of being, separately, informed on the game chosen by nature 2 . We can imagine that this change might take place as the informed player may deliberately choose to forgo her informational advantage to favour an alternative arrangement that may provide both individuals with the possibility of more efficient coordination. Once informed, the players' machines will then be engaged in a one-to-one informational exchange only with the third computer, not between themselves, according to the Rubinstein's procedure. In the Coordinated Attack this could translate into the general being separated from the army altogether, initially sending the same message independently and simultaneously to the two halves.
Hence the number of messages sent by each player's machine, to the third one, is compatible with any number of messages sent by the opponent's computer to the mediating figure. At all states of the world, this would entail lack of mutual knowledge of the game and yet more efficient coordination may follow. Then, in the model the number of messages privately observed will serve only as a correlation device for players' choices since, unlike what happens in Rubinstein, they can reveal no information on the opponent's knowledge of the game.
The Model

The Electronic Mail Game (EMG)
We recall here the EMG version of Osborne and Rubinstein (1994) , where two individuals (I and II) have to play one of the two coordination games depicted in Fig. 1 below.
2 Should the third party be an individual we assume her preferences to be such that she has no
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Messages are independent of each other. With probability one communication eventually To simplify notation, from now on a strategy in the game will be written as
where I(t i =t) is the standard indicator function. So, for example δ i =I(t i =0) is the strategy for player i specifying the choice of A at type (t i =0) and of B at all other types.
The Mediated Electronic Mail Game (MEMG)
By MEMG we mean an EMG modified in the following way. ΨI ; ΨII ΨII (0) ΨII (1) ΨII (2) ΨII (3) ΨI (4 
The Main Result
For completeness, below we recall Rubinstein's finding.
Proposition 1 (Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994) In the MEMG a multiplicity of equilibria is instead possible. In particular, the following theorem presents the main result of the paper. More specifically, it formalises the existence of an equilibrium where both players choose, at all types, actions as in the efficient equilibrium of the EMG with common knowledge of the game played. 
where g(ε) is a function independent of δ I (0). Thus choosing A is optimal for I, namely
, which is always true as p<1/2 and ε(1-ε)<1. ii) Assume now t I =t≥1. By a consideration analogous to that for t I =0, it is easy to see that its marginal probability is P(t I =t)= pε(1-ε) 2t-1 + pε(1-ε) 2t = pε(1-ε) 2t-1 (2-ε) . It then follows that
where h(ε) is a function independent of δ I (t). Hence, action B is optimal for I, i.e. δ I (t)=0, if and only if P(t II =0|t I =t)<q. But
P(t II =0|t I =t)=P(t II =0,t I =t)/P(t I =t)=P((t,0,t+1)∪ (t,0,t+2))/P(t I =t)
from which
showing that δ** is best reply for I against player II choosing δ** if and only if ε<q.
(2) Since player's II situation is perfectly symmetric, her reasoning will be exactly the same at all types and the result follows.
The above theorem shows the possibility for the pair (δ**,δ**) to be a Nash 
namely ε <M/(L+M-1) which when (δ**,δ**) is a Nash Equilibrium holds true.
Hence, as long as the failure message probability is less than q, players would be better off by coordinating on action B whenever observing at least one message. With respect to the EMG the introduction of a mediating figure, sending separate messages to each player, renders each individual's type uninformative with respect to the opponent's type. Though message failure probabilities are equal, it is now possible to obtain multiple equilibria as long as communication channels are sufficiently reliable. Alternatively, unlike what happens in the original Rubinstein's model, the probability value now counts.
Conclusions
In the Mediated (version of the) Electronic Mail Game that we have investigated, indirect informational exchange can enhance an equilibrium with more efficient coordination if the message error probability ε is sufficiently low, with the upper bound being determined by the purely mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium of one of the two coordination games that individuals have to play. For each player, the conditional (to her own type) probability on the opponent's type clearly depends on ε. As, in equilibrium, such probability represents a player's belief on the opponent choosing a specific action, then it is not surprising that the optimal choice could depend upon the value of ε. To conclude, the example presented in the paper appears to suggest that when information exchanged by the individuals on the game to be played is noisy, as long as the reliability of communication channels appropriately supports personal beliefs on the choices available to the other, individual knowledge of a game may suffice for efficient coordination to obtain.
